Introduction
Knowledge Exchange (KE) has become central to the planning, conduct and evaluation of publicly-funded research in the UK. The Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC) panacea for a range of urban problems and increasingly, creative city thinking appears as orthodoxy.
One productive strand of scholarship in recent years has traced the mechanisms by which creative city policies achieved this orthodoxical status. In his work on New Zealand's adoption of creative economic policies in the 2000s, Prince has explored the formation of a global governmental "assemblage" (Prince 2010a: 875) through which creative-economic concepts travel. For Prince (2010a: 876) , this assemblage includes state institutions and quangos, and also an ever-changing cast of 'experts' -including academics and consultantswho are instrumental in propagating creative-economic policies, and adapting them to specific national and regional contexts. As Prince (2010a Prince ( , 2010b Prince ( , 2012a Prince ( , 2012b and others (Chapain and Comunian 2010; Kong et al 2006; Schlesinger et al 2015a Schlesinger et al , 2015b ) have demonstrated, there is an increasing amount of 'traffic' between the spheres of academia and creative economy policy or advocacy, particularly at an elite level.
Doing KE in the creative economy
Of course the links between universities and the creative economy are not restricted to the movement of elite academics. As noted in the introduction, in recent years the pressures upon academics to engage with government and policymakers, and the business community -and to demonstrate quantifiable 'impact' have become more pronounced. Whilst there is consensus that the idea of impact is not new (Staeheli and Mitchell 2005) , there is a great deal of disagreement about the extent to which impact, increasingly formalised through the REF and operationalised at a range of scales, might act as a disciplinary mechanism (see Smith et al 2011) .
On the one hand, some scholars argue that impact acts as an implicit steer for academics, too many of whom do not give enough thought to non-academic communities when designing and conducting their research (Pain 2014; Pain et al 2011) . For these scholarswho approach research design from an activist perspective, and who are leading proponents of the experimental participatory and ethnographic methodologies mentioned aboveimpact is one way of ensuring that research is no longer produced and consumed within ivory tower institutions. As Williams (2013: 235) has also pointed out with particular reference to research conducted with and within communities in the Global South, under the auspices of the 'impact agenda', there is real potential for institutions and individual researchers to do 'good', intellectually, ethically and emotionally satisfying work. Williams (2013: 235) goes on to argue that Universities and individual researchers "have the scope to play the impact game in ways that make it less corrosive of academic freedom and solidarity, and to make themselves less exploitative in their relationships with partner organisations".
Williams ' (2012, 2013) critiques bring much-needed nuance, and a subtle shift in perspective, to debates about KE and impact which -to date -have largely been conducted within academic networks in the Global North.
Other authors, however, have argued that, given this increasing focus on real-world relevance, academics are losing their autonomy. Many feel under pressure to fit their research to match the desires of 'user communities' (to use the terminology common within the 'user engagement' strategies required by many funding agencies) on the one hand, and RCUK on the other. As Moreton (2013 Moreton ( , 2015 has argued, for many researchers, these dual pressures are the most visible and intrusive expressions of the broader economic and political changes affecting the HE sector in the UK (and elsewhere). Moreton (2015: 103) notes that the wider landscape of HE funding changes -including extensive cuts to teaching budgets, coupled with a wholesale reorganisation of the tuition fee system for students -means that, complexly, education is being framed on the one hand as a significant personal investment on the part of students and their families (and one upon which they can reasonably expect returns) and on the other as a "public good" that should serve a wider societal purpose. Within this new research economy, powerful normative constructions of what it means to be a 'productive' academic (that is, one who engages in 'world-class' research and teaching, whilst also building fruitful relationships with external stakeholders, and effectively communicating their research to the public) also come into play, profoundly affecting processes of academic identity construction.
Within the sphere of specifically creative industries research, the drive to do 'impactful' research draws academics further into the multi-scalar assemblage identified by Prince (Prince 2010a, 2010b; see also Schlesinger 2009). Whilst the work of Prince helps us to understand how the drive to engage with government, policymakers, and the business community affects the movement of ideas, there is relatively little work that details the mundane activities and practices that constitute academics' attempts to 'do' KE, and to effect impact (however see Moreton 2013 Moreton , 2015 Williams 2012 Williams , 2013 Williamson et al 2011) . As O'Brien and Campbell (2015) argue, the intentions and practices of those academics who form part of the creative-economic assemblage (particularly those who sit outside of the 'academic elite') are often lost or elided with the wider 'creative economy' project, making subtleties in critique and interpretation difficult to recover. In detailing the practice of KE insofar as it relates to one, relatively small AHRCfunded project, I highlight the messy reality of academics' attempts to produce new knowledge within the creative economy.
The enduring influence of 'knowledge transfer'.
transfer ' (Knight and Lightowler 2010; Knight and Lyall 2013) . These typologies are key to discussions of knowledge movement and flow within management literatures. Kitigawa and Lightowler (2010: 3) , in their comparison of the different KE strategies at play in Scotland and England, note that historically there has been a "relatively narrow commercial focus in terms of the transfer object, emphasizing patents, licensing and the creation of spin-offs originating from academic research". Kitigawa and Lightowler (2010: 3) demonstrate that, insofar as it is currently conceptualised by RCUK, knowledge exchange is a far more diffuse process, stating "today universities are encouraged by various funding and policy instruments to actively engage in the diffusion of research-based knowledge by multiple routes, including [...] 'relationship-based' knowledge transfer activities". Similarly, Knight and Lyall (2013: 310) state that "there is growing recognition that the processes involved are neither unidirectional nor simple, as is perhaps implied in the older phrase 'knowledge (or technology) transfer".
As I show throughout this article, despite the increasingly popularity and acceptance of 'relationship-based' KE, models of knowledge transfer have left a lasting impression. The increase in the number of knowledge exchange brokers in Scottish universities for example, as investigated by Kitigawa and Lightowler (2010) , implies that KE is sometimes still understood as a process of 'translation', whereby someone -and academic, or a brokersimply 'translates' research data into a form valued by the 'user'. In this respect, knowledge within KE strategies may still be understood as something that can be codified, and that may move unproblematically from 'expert' to 'user' 1 . Crossick (2006 Crossick ( , 2009 has persuasively that this model of KE is ill-suited to the complexities and contingencies of collaboration and engagement within the creative economy (see also Pratt 2014). Moreton (2015: 109) articulates the key challengers faced by those academics who engage with pressures to 'impact', noting:
The challenge that has emerged for the AHRC's non-STEM 2 disciplines is how to take part in [knowledge exchange] activities in manner commensurate with the disciplinary practices and outputs of the arts and humanities disciplines. This is difficult especially given the commercial underpinning of many existing knowledge exchange policies where the cultural outputs of the humanities are less ready to be codified or productised.
Cultural Enterprise Office
CEO is a small, primarily publicly-funded creative business development agency based in Glasgow, Scotland. Its focus is on microbusinesses working within the creative sector in Scotland. When it was launched in 2001, CEO's remit was to support recent graduates from creative undergraduate courses, helping them to become 'business ready' by developing their entrepreneurial skills. In the intervening years, CEO has been shaped by the priorities of consecutive Scottish governments, and other public agencies such as the now-defunct Scottish Arts Council and its replacement, Creative Scotland.
The deep level of dependency between the Scottish Government at Holyrood and the UK Government at Westminster on the matter of the creative economy means that small agencies such as CEO are embedded within an extremely complex and dynamic policy landscape (Schlesinger et al 2015a) . As such, they have to be fleet of foot in order to keep up with policy directives formulated at a range of scales. Like many intermediaries, they are also precarious -funding is competed for on short cycles, meaning that it is difficult for the organisation to act strategically.
When we entered the field, CEO was a small organisation with bases in Glasgow, Edinburgh and Dundee 3 . CEO provided information (via the website, or over the phone) to practitioners and microbusinesses in order to help them become 'business ready'.
Additionally, CEO provided one-to-one advice sessions, and general one-to-many training events across Scotland. Information, advice and events formed the 'core' of CEO's activities, although they also ran a range of competitive programmes that offered more comprehensive and tailored training and support. The setting-up of our project relied heavily on the PI's pre-existing contacts and networks (most notably the Chair of CEO's board, and the Director). The fact that the PI was known to key players within the creative sector worked to our advantage in that we were trusted, and welcomed in to the organisation as a team, although of course it took time for us to become embedded in the field.
As the project progressed however it became clear that my personal and professional connections within the creative sector in Scotland were also of vital importance. These connections meant that I was trusted, and could move around the sector with ease (and also move easily back-and-forth between the spheres of academia, and the creative sector), however this came with a number of drawbacks. The extent of my connections within the Scottish creative sector meant that, for some months in 2013, I was never 'off' -to attend a cultural event, say, in Glasgow would likely bring me into contact with CEO staff, or stakeholders in the research, and this meant always being alert to what was going on within the project, and being careful not to let slip any information that colleagues within the partner organisation might not be privy to, and to lightly deflect any off-the-record questions concerning the research team. Whilst all research projects require such discretion, the networked nature of the creative sector -particularly in a 'hub' city such as Glasgow -requires careful positioning on the part of the researcher 4 . In order to engender respect, researchers occupying this creative space have to display connections to academic and policy debates on the one hand, and an understanding of life at the sharp end on the other. Furthermore, they have to be recognised as trustworthy and discreet, but also knowledgeable and willing to share their expertise in line with prevailing norms in the sector (Banks 2006; Banks et al., 2000) .
There are three points I want to make here regarding the difficulty of doing relationshipbased KE within a heavily-networked sector. The first is that even accounting for the PI's pre-existing knowledge of the partner organisation, and key members of staff, it took time to build a relationship with CEO. Our project was funded by the AHRC for one year, yet the task I was set -to do relationship-based KE in a sector that has a distinctive way of functioning -was incompatible with that timescale. After one year, the PI made the case to the University and the AHRC that dissemination (and 'impact') would suffer were we to stick to the agreed timescale. In the end, the AHRC granted a no-cost extension, the University funded a second year of my salary, and the PI and Co-I continued to put time into the project past the end of their 'buy-outs'.
The second point is that building an effective KE relationship required considerable 5 By way of example, CCPR is well-known within Media and Communications research for conducting policy-relevant and 'impactful' research. As a result, these concepts assume real currency in researchers' day to day lives, as we are often called upon in research team meetings and wider Centre meetings to 'report back' on the progress of our research, and describe our activities using the language of KE and impact.
to-day research activities and relationships, this pressure is exacerbated. A further pressure perhaps specific to ECRs and contract researchers is that, when applying for jobs or promotions, we are increasingly expected to demonstrate local, national and international networks of potential collaborators. As a result, ECRs are under intense pressure to keep partners 'on side' in case they lead to productive future collaborations.
Third, as noted above we entered the field at a time of upheaval for CEO, which resulted in considerable anxiety amongst the staff. In this atmosphere, we had to be sensitive; because this was a KE project, the stakes were, if not higher, then certainly different. In this case, treading carefully was not simply about ensuring cordial relations, but ensuring individuals felt valued and respected, able to speak freely and challenge us where appropriate -in short, we had to keep the potential for 'exchange' open.
Divergent methodologies
In their examination of KE in the music industry Williamson et al (2011) note that a mismatch between participants' demand for relevance and applied knowledge, and academics' demand for methodological rigour and replicability can lead to tension. These authors argue that what 'counts' as useful knowledge for KE partners in the music industry is usually knowledge that enables individuals or firms to gain competitive market advantage or, alternatively (and more in line with RCUK's imagined research impact), knowledge that can inform policy. 6 A more mundane point that complements Williamson et al's (2011) assertion concerns the potential mismatch between the range of methods commonly employed by academics and the way that research participants within the creative economy expect research to proceed, which is normally informed by experience of consultancy.
Within the creative sector, consultants are usually hired in order to help management tackle a specific issue, or to make recommendations as regards future strategy. Additionally, as
Prince (2012) findings -thoughts, works-in-progress -and took advantage of the (by consultancy's standards) relatively long duration of the project in order to go off on 'tangents', in keeping with the iterative mode of research that we were used to.
The extended periods of observation central to ethnographic research sat at odds with the expectations of CEO's staff. Throughout 2013, I spent long periods working within CEO's offices. Most of the time, I was working 'on' the CEO project -observing routines, attending meetings and requesting and reading relevant documentation -however, occasionally I was not 'working' insofar as some members of CEO staff saw it. In particular, the nature of researching the creative industries involved doing web research, and research on and through social media. One minor, but telling incident occurred early in my fieldwork, when I was in South Block researching a textiles client of CEO's that I was due to interview.
I was scrolling through her website, noting the array of products, their design, their price points, and so on, when I was challenged by a member of CEO staff who questioned whether I was working, or shopping. I attempted to laugh it off, but was mortified that I'd been turned into the centre of attention in the busy office.
This alerted me to the fact that, although CEO had welcomed us in to their space to conduct KE, it was not entirely clear to them what that entailed. Whilst some confusion over what academic research entails is likely within any researched population, the commonplace nature of consultancy within the creative sector exacerbated this confusion. It is unlikely a consultant would be embedded in the office, so CEO staff would only ever have seen the 'meat' of consultancy research, which primarily consists of interviews and perhaps work-shadowing, and the validity of our academic methodology was, at times, questioned.
Somewhat paradoxically however, when the time came to leave the field, we were often asked, "When are you next in?" One challenge of having excellent access was that, when we were not in CEO's office, our absence was noted. In part this was almost certainly due to a further difference between the conduct of academic research and of consultancy -the tangible 'effects' of our research had not been made immediately visible, hence it may have looked as if we had disappeared without producing anything of import. As Pickerill (2014) notes, there is often a mismatch between the timescales of academic research and of partners, with research partners often requiring immediate impact, and academics unable to provide this.
Challenging academic expertise.
In line with the original research proposal, we organised three KE events. All three were held at the University of Glasgow. The first, in November 2013, involved all CEO staff, and represented a chance for the research team to present some preliminary findings. The second was held in January 2014, and involved CEO's Business Support team. The third was held in March 2014, and was outward-facing, attended by CEO staff, policy-makers, academics and creative support agencies from across Europe.
In the initial user-engagement strategy, the PI and Co-I stated that the team would deliver interim and final reports to the Director of CEO. In addition to this, the PI and Director had regular meetings to discuss the findings of the research, and there were three meetings across the life of the research with the full University of Glasgow team and members of CEO's senior management, which allowed us to discuss progress. At several points during the project, our partners challenged the results presented by the academic team. In this section I focus on two instances of this, the first concerns the delivery of the interim report to the partner, and the second describes the confusion that arose relating to the delivery of the final report.
Following negotiation with the Director and senior management team, it was decided that the interim report would extend the findings presented at the first KE event, based on feedback from those present. In the report, we presented a comprehensive narrative of CEO's growth and development, made suggestions concerning the training of CEO's advisers (the small team of full and part time staff who were charged with advising creative sector clients on their business practice) and presented some initial findings regarding the organisational restructure that had taken place in summer 2013.
The bulk of this report was welcomed -in particular, the brief organisational history we presented, gleaned from close document analysis and interviews, was exactly what the Director needed in order to build a narrative for funders that described CEO's impact on the sector. However as we were writing, we thought this particular section of the report would be most useful for the Director to rally her staff, who were showing signs of fatigue after years of organisational change. We thought our narrative might help reconnect staff with CEO's wider purpose and its founding principles, and that this would facilitate greater understanding around the precariousness of the organisation and its need to constantly shift focus -but this was not the way that our work was taken up.
Other elements of the report were understood by the Director as premature criticism, and were contested. We felt that, based on our observations around CEO, and our interviews with staff, that poor communication around the restructure of 2013 had led to unnecessary confusion for the team of floor staff. Whilst we were confident in our findings, it was clear that at a time of considerable upheaval, the Director did not consider this useful knowledge -it did not offer a direction for future strategy, nor material of interest to policymakersrather it was read as an inconvenience at a time when the Director's attention was turned outwards, not inwards. Additionally, our explicit challenge to her organisational strategy was read as an attempt to undermine her authority at a time when she felt she needed to display leadership.
In light of the tensions that arose around the delivery of the interim report, the PI was keen to carefully manage delivery of the final report, however as the deadline drew near interest from the Director waned and we were unsure of how to proceed. At this time we came under real pressure from the team of floor staff to deliver something that would offer some organisational stability, as they felt fatigued with change. In the event -in light of the fact that our previous report had not been welcomed, and knowing how familiar CEO were with consultancy -we delivered a 'consultancy-style' report, with observations matched with concrete suggestions, however it turned out that this format was not at all what the Director and senior management team had in mind, and the report was scrapped.
With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that at this time, the spectre of funding cuts began to loom large, and the Director's attention became focused less on making the abstract case for CEO's utility, and more on keeping the organisation up and running. This meant she became less concerned with our attempts to demonstrate how CEO fitted in to shifts in Scottish, UK and European policy and more concerned with the work that we had done that examined CEO's day-today operations, and the impact that they had had on specific sectors, and individual, well-known and internationally-successful Scottish businesses.
However because at this time the Director was concerned primarily with keeping the organisation afloat, communications between the research team and the Director were intermittent, and we stepped back for fear of putting her under extra pressure. The resulting confusion demonstrates the extent to which academic 'expertise' may, when it comes to informing the day-to-day running of an SME, prove impractical -we took an educated guess about what the Director might need, and we were wrong. However, because of our continuing engagement with the field, we did note that many of the suggestions put forward in that report -including those concerning the need to capitalise on and exploit CEO's own intellectual property, the conduct of meetings and the circulation of knowledge within the organisation -became the basis for shifts in organisational strategy.
Making sense of 'informal' KE
It became clear as our research progressed that KE is not simply something that occurs through events, and user-engagement strategies, rather, it also occurs within everyday interactions in the field. As previously noted, ethnographers have long made the case for recognising the full complexity of researchers' entanglements with the field 7 . Within organisational ethnography, this extends to making the case for recognising the diversity of the field, and taking seriously research scenarios that may at first glance seem unworthy of attention. It also entails recognising that researchers' presence in the field affects the research (and the researched) in multiple ways.
One example that speaks to the potential impact of informal KE concerns CEO's social media strategy. Within the creative sector, social media are often used to make connections between individuals and firms, in an extension of the adage that the sector primarily exists within clusters and networks. When we entered the field in 2013, CEO was unusual amongst its creative intermediary 'peers' in that it did not have a strong presence on social media, particularly on Twitter. As the research progressed we discovered that this was deliberate, and the senior management team were keen to keep it that way. Largely, it stemmed from concerns over maintaining a strong and coherent 'brand image' (social media were seen as introducing an unwelcome element of messiness into this).
CEO used a Tweet-scheduling application to tweet information at pre-defined times. Hence
Twitter was used to 'broadcast' information, but clients were not invited to engage with CEO. Many of the clients we interviewed found that unusual, and frustrating. Twitter was used to route clients and potential clients into the core service; at a time of stretched resources, it seemed that CEO could have looked at whether or not it was practicable to pass on information via Twitter rather than suggesting clients call the office.
sympathetic to recent critiques of the 'impact' agenda, the debate thus far suffers from a lack of nuance. We have arrived at a point where there is little room for a frank discussion of the practice of KE, because at a time of increasing pressure upon academics to capture grant funding, and to demonstrate success at KE and impact, the overwhelming tendency is to report back 'success stories'. Whilst in some respects, our research could be seen as a success story -we maintained a good relationship with the partner organisation, we impacted their form and function, we have conducted extensive public engagement using the project as a springboard, and we have published widely -the project did not always go to plan, and the process of doing KE was characterised by moments of confusion, tension and exasperation. As Schlesinger (2009b) has written, we need to be honest about the fact that sometimes knowledge is not successfully exchanged -it is resisted, ignored or taken up in unexpected ways. Detailing instances where KE doesn't go as planned works to problematize the process by which academic research becomes relevant in the sphere of policy or organisational practice.
Much of the critical work that has sought to investigate how creative-economic policy travels has focused on para-state institutions and organisations, and key 'elite' actors working within and between these. Rather less attention has been paid to the implementation of creative-economic policy by smaller intermediary agencies, and the attempts of academics -elite or otherwise -to impact their form and function. The second aim of this article, then, is to build upon and nuance important work done by scholars such as Prince (2010, 2012, 2014) by paying attention to the activities and practices of academics working within the sphere of the creative economy, and the ways in which they position themselves in relation to a number of pressures: the strict requirements of funding agencies, the needs of 'user communities', implicit and explicit institutional norms, and their own desire to do 'good', 'useful' research. however the need to report back to funders allows for the capture of snapshots only. As this article also demonstrates, we also need to be more attentive to the importance of 'informal' KE, or KE that occurs outside of formal user-engagement strategies. As I have shown, the intricacies of 'informal' KE are difficult to capture. In part this is because the information being exchanged as part of informal KE need not be a verbal or written suggestion, rather, it might be a practice that originates with the researcher and is wittingly or unwittingly taken up by the researched; it might be introduction to a new metric, theory or author; it might be a mode of communication or comportment; it might entail brokering connections or friendships or it might lie in all of these things. The assumption that the information exchanged will always take a particular (usually spoken or written) form is, arguably, a legacy of the dominance of programmatic understandings of knowledge transfer.
This assumption closes off understanding of the subtle ways in which embedding researchers in the field with the goal of 'impacting' the research milieu might play out. It goes without saying that successful KE also relies on both partners knowing that knowledge has been exchanged. This throws up a further issue in relation to informal KE, in that as researchers, we are trained to 'see' our impact on the field, however for the researched this will almost inevitably be less visible, making capturing impact problematic.
Difficulties arise when trying to report back on informal KE particularly as this type of KE is often to be conducted by RAs, working full-time on fieldwork, and with less control over what is reported back to funders, and what appears in publications and other forms of dissemination. Additionally, the practice of informal KE, and its effects, might appear vague and not 'worth' writing about. Moreover, properly accounting for it requires detailed thick description, of the kind that is difficult to incorporate into journal articles (given the constraints of word counts), and is unlikely to be appreciated in end of project reports, media coverage, newsletters or website copy. An ancillary aim of this paper, then, is to conceptualise the role that ECRs play in the conduct of KE, and to demonstrate how the standard modes of planning, delivering and reporting on KE projects leave little room for articulating their labour. Recent work by Gupta (2014) and Middleton and Cons (2014) stresses the importance of contract researchers to the production of academic knowledge given the extent of their immersion in the field; I argue here for extension of this work in order to draw attention to the ways in which the work of ECRs might be crucial to ensuring effective KE, particularly in settings where relationship-based KE is required. It stands to reason that I also align myself with Gupta (2014) and Middleton and Cons (2014) when they argue for greater attention to be paid to the taxing nature of RA work, and the pressure that RAs are under to perform complex academic and relationship-management roles on research projects.
